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The Political and Economic Determinants of Trade Disputes under the WTO 
 
Abstract 
This study developed a conceptual analysis based on an asymmetric deterrence game with 
incomplete information to analyze how trade disputes arise between a given pair of WTO 
members.  We found that the probability of trade dispute is an increasing function of the level of 
subsidies curtailments sought by the challenger.  We hypothesized the challenger￿s demand is 
determined by the political and economic profiles of the countries involved.  An empirical 
investigation of the roles of these political and economic variables yielded mixed results, 
highlighting, in some cases, the preeminence of political or economic heterogeneity within dyads 
and, in other, that of homogeneity.  These findings were attributed to the shifting paradigm in 
international trade with the emergence of economic powers such as China, India, Korea, and 
Brazil, to name a few, with political and economic profiles different from those of traditional 
major players such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan.   
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The World Trade Organization (WTO) emerged as an international organization following the 
Uruguay Round trade negotiations in 1995.  Like its predecessor, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), this multilateral trade regime was founded to provide a new forum 
for countries to cooperate and coordinate policies on a variety of trade issues and to promote free 
trade between countries.  Both the GATT and the WTO as institutions have created norms or 
standards of behavior and set up rules and procedures concerning global trade between nations.  
These institutions would become increasingly important as national economies became more 
intertwined through globalization.   
  Under the GATT￿s general principles include most-favored nation (MFN) status to all 
participating countries as well as lowering tariffs for a variety of goods and later regulating non-
tariff barriers.  Dispute settlement was also built on the concept of reciprocity, that all member 
countries benefit from agreed trade concessions and there were specific rules over items such as 
safeguards measures that were put into place to prevent trade policies in one country from 
causing economic harm to another country (Hoekman and Koesteki 2001).   
While trade has increased considerably over the years, one cannot state that nations have 
always been able to cooperate and coordinate their policies as disputes still emerge over a variety 
of trade issues, including subsidies to production and exports.  By encouraging and promoting 
the idea of free trade, the WTO offers an opportunity for states to deal with their disputes in a 
peaceful manner and by some accounts, it could be argued that both institutions have been 
successful at regulating and fostering cooperation between trading entities.  Trade volume and 
membership count have increased over time and traded goods more diversified.  There are 150 
nation-states who are members of the WTO as of January 2007 (WTO, 2007).  There have been  4
over 329 trade disputes under the WTO regime in its first decade from 1995 to 2005, almost as 
many as under GATT during its entire existence.  With these statistics, one would wonder if this 
is an indication that member states are unable to cooperate over trade issues; or is it, as liberal 
institutionalists would argue, a sign of success because the WTO and its dispute settlement 
process allows countries to settle disputes in a peaceful fashion as countries become more 
confident in the ability of the institution to resolve their disputes (Busch and Reinhardt 2002; 
Keohane 1984).  It is important to evaluate which factors have played a role in the dispute 
process within the WTO.  This study, therefore, seeks to analyze both conceptually and 
empirically what determines the probability that a given pair of WTO members will have a 
formal WTO dispute.  The conceptual analysis is a departure from previous studies, especially in 
the political science literature, which have merely focused on the empirical side.   
Two sets of literature have attempted to explain the determinants of trade disputes.  One 
set emphasizes the importance of economic factors and the other places greater emphasis on the 
role of political factors as the primary determinants of trade disputes initiations and outcomes 
(Busch 2000; Busch and Reinhardt 2002; Reinhardt 1999; Sherman 2001).  Economic factors 
have played important roles in trade disputes.  These factors include: the level of trade 
dependency between countries, trade openness, value of exports, level of employment in each 
sector, and international competitiveness (Cohen 1990; Krueger 1996; Busch 1999; McGillivray 
et al. 2001; Gawande and Krishna 2003).  While these studies highlight several economic factors 
as determinants of trade disputes, they slight the significance of political factors.  For the most 
part, the economics literature ignores the role of the state and the way domestic political 
institutions may play an important role throughout the dispute settlement process.  5
The political science literature has highlighted the role domestic political factors play in 
the outcomes of international conflicts (Putnam 1988; Fearon 1994; Goldstein 1996; Milner 
1997).  The democratic peace literature has underscored the role of domestic factors such as 
regime types in international conflicts.  Many studies have observed that democracies were more 
likely to initiate conflicts and more likely to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner.  Other 
scholars have noted that non-democratic states and mixed dyads (a mixture of democratic and 
non democratic states) have a greater tendency to become involved in international disputes 
(Maoz and Abdolai 1989; Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Ray 1995; Chan 1997; Maoz 1998; Reiter 
and Stam 1998; Russett and O￿Neal 2001; Huth and Allee 2002).  While this may be the case in 
military conflicts, there is no reason to believe that it is so in trade disputes.  In fact, one would 
argue that trade conflicts are more likely to breakout between two democracies, considering that 
under a democratic system of government politicians are sanctioned or rewarded through the 
electoral process based on how well they represent the interest of their constituents or citizens.  
In that sense, some scholars have argued for greater attention on how different regime types have 
emerged and the type of trading relationships that exist between democratic countries as 
alternative explanations for the democratic peace (Chan 1997; Maoz 1998; Rasler and Thompson 
2003, 2005; Zeng 2002, 2004). 
  We develop a conceptual analysis of interstate trade dispute to help shed light into the 
roles of economic and political factors on trade disputes.  The conceptual analysis is the 
foundation of the modeling structure used in this study.  The proposed model identifies and 
separates the impact of institutional differences on the trade dispute process.  It also captures the 
variation in the types of democracies, economic and electoral factors at the monadic and dyadic 
level.    6
Conceptual Analysis and Model Derivation 
We illustrate our conceptual analysis of inter-state trade disputes by assuming a cost-competitive 
country i and a less cost-competitive country j , both producing the same commodity.  Let us 
further assume that the two countries have a net surplus of the commodity, which they seek to 
dispense in the world market.  Both countries have specific profiles such as economic strength, 
system of government, trade openness, and political climates.  These variables determine to 
various degrees how these two countries conduct their affairs at the domestic and international 
stages.  Considering country i seeks to maximize a social welfare function () , ii i wuvwith the 
utility  i u a function of export earnings  i e  and  i v  representing the utility drawn from the other 
sectors of its economy.  Likewise, considering country j seeks to maximize a social welfare 
function () , j jj wuv with the utility  j u  a function of exports  j e .  The social welfare function of 
country i is an increasing function of export earnings.  More formally, we can write 
() ii ue φ = , 0 ii ue ∂∂ > , and  0 ii we ∂∂ > .  Country j  is net exporter of the commodity because of 
the production and export subsidies allocated to producers and exporters of the traded 
commodity.  Thus, the social welfare function of country j  is an increasing function of  j e , which 
in turn is an increasing function of production subsidies j s .  Formally,  () j j ue φ = ,  0 jj ue ∂∂ > , 
and  0 jj we ∂∂ > .  The rise in exports by country  j  induces a welfare loss in country i on two 
fronts: a decline in world price of the traded commodity as well as a potential loss of market 
share as a result of these subsidies.  Thus, export earnings in country i are a decreasing function 
of level of support  j s  in country j ; hence are harmful to the welfare of producers in country i.  
We can formally write, ,  0 ij es ∂∂< ,  0 jj es ∂∂ > ,  0 ij ws ∂∂ < ,  and  0 jj ws ∂∂ > .   7
  We applied a simple analytic based on the concept of asymmetric deterrence game with 
incomplete information (Zagare and Kilgour, 2000)  to the situation described above to further 
our understanding of how inter-state trade disputes arise.  Under the framework, the entity with 
incomplete information makes a decision to challenge the status quo based on the expected 
payoff of the challenge, its beliefs of how the defendant would respond to the challenge, and the 
cost of the challenge.  The defendant responds to the challenge solely based on its evaluation of 
the expected benefit of maintaining the status quo and the cost of litigation.  Reed (2003) and 
Grinols and Perrelli (2006) used similar approach in their respective studies.  Reed study 
analyzed the role of power parity and information asymmetries in enhancing uncertainty in 
international politics and the likelihood of inter-states conflicts.  Grinols and Perrelli devised a 
simple litigation game to analyze the duration of trade dispute.  In our study, we consider the 
context in which country i (i.e., the challenger) facing the above-described circumstances to 
either accept the status quo situation with a utility of export earning () 1 i e φ or challenge country j  
(i.e., the defendant) to cut its level of production subsidies on the basis that they are harmful to 
its economy and the welfare of its producers.  The challenger would issue a formal demand to the 
defendant if its expected utility under this scenario is greater than that under the status quo 
situation and the defendant will not yield to the challenger￿s demand if its expected benefit from 
fighting ( j j pb × ) exceeds the total level of support ( j s ) less the cost to fight the challenge ( j c ).  
The cost of challenge includes cost of litigation and retaliation by the challenger.    
  Assuming as in Reed that the probability  j p at the basis of the decision to yield or fight 
the challenge has a density  () f ⋅  and cumulative distribution () F ⋅ , then the probability that the 
defendant would yield to the challenger￿s demand can be explicitly written as  8
1( ) / j jj Fs c b  −−  .  A von Neumann-Morgenstern representation of the challenger￿s expected 
utility function of export earnings may be formally stated as follows 
() () () 23 [ 1 () ] [ () ] ij i i EU s F e F e φφ =− ⋅ + ⋅ .   (1) 
This component  () 2 i e φ of the expected utility function is the pay-off for the challenger if the 
defendant yields to its demand and the component  () 3 i e φ  is the payoff if the defendant faces off 
the challenger.  These two components are respectively weighted by the probability of the 
defendant yielding to the demand and the probability of facing the challenge.  Furthermore, the 
utility  () 3 i e φ  is itself an expected utility that involves the payoff for the challenger if it wins and 
the payoff if it loses with weighting probabilities independent of j s .  The challenger￿s preference 
may be ranked as follows:  () () () 231 iii eee φφφ >>.  Assuming the challenger￿s threats are 
credible, the two countries would likely enter a dispute process if the defendant does not yield to 
the demand.  The challenger believes it would win any arbitration, which is the reason to issue 
the demand in the first place.  The function  () 2 i e φ  is assumed dependent of j s  though to a lesser 
extent.  The first order condition of the utility maximization process is derived from the partial 
derivative with respect to the control variable j s of the challenger expected utility of export 
earnings.  Thus,  
() () () () 32 2 /( ) [ ] / [ 1 ( ) ]/ j ji i j i j EU s s f e e b F e s φφ φ ∂∂ = ⋅ − + − ⋅ ∂ ∂ .   (2) 
The first component of the utility maximization process is the expected marginal gain from the 
support curtailments scenario and the second is the marginal loss incurred by the challenger 
because of a marginal increase in production subsidies by the defendant.  Setting the first order 
condition to zero yields the following relationship  9
() () ()
1
23 2 ()/1 () [ / ] [ ] ji jii fFbe see φφ φ
− ⋅−⋅ = − × ∂ ∂ × − .   (3) 
The left hand side of the equality is the hazard rate function  () h ⋅ defined as the probability of 
trade dispute occurring at time period ￿t￿ given that it has not occurred prior to that time period.  
It is conditional on the information set at time ￿t-1￿, which includes the already defined country 
characteristics.  Thus, an increase of  j s  raises the probability of trade conflict between the two 
countries.  The hazard rate is greater than zero as long as the negotiated outcome remains 
dependent on some level of subsidies by country j and converges to zero if the negotiated 
outcome results in the elimination of the contested subsidies; that is () 2 /0 . ij es φ ∂∂ =   
  The optimal level of subsidies j s  to challenge without compromising the possibility of 
reaching a negotiated outcome can be derived by solving the first order condition of the expected 
utility maximization for j s .  However, one could also argue that there is always a positive 
probability of conflict because the challenger would likely overplay its hands by seeking deeper 
cuts in subsidies because of  the information asymmetry between the contending countries leads 
a challenger to misjudge how much of its demand a targeted defendant is willing to accept.  The 
probability of conflict is found by solving equation (3) for () F ⋅ .  It is a function of  j s , thus, 
conditional on specific countries￿ characteristics as previously stated..   
 
Estimation Procedures and Data 
The determining role of political and economic factors on trade disputes was illustrated in the 
conceptual analysis.  The analysis shows the importance of the challengers￿ and defendants￿ 
specific and relative characteristics that need to be accounted for in an inter-sate trade dispute 
model.  In this section, we propose a binary choice model based on the conceptual analysis,  10
which provides a framework to estimate the probability of trade disputes between a challenger 
and a defendant while accounting for the heterogeneity between the two states.  More formally, 
let  , kt s the level of contested subsidies within the 
th k  dyad (i.e., challenger and defendant) at time 
￿t￿ be a latent variable and  , kt d  a binary choice variable equal to one if a trade dispute breaks out 
for a given dyad and zero otherwise.  Following Wooldridge (2001) we define the binary choice 
model with serially correlated error as follows 
,, kt kt s ε ′ =+ k,t x β 1 k d =  if  ,, kt jt s s >  and 0 otherwise,  ,, 1 , kt kt kt ε ρ ε µ − =+ , and  ~( 0 , 1 ) N µ  (4) 
Where  , j t s is a the same as  j s  defined in the conceptual analysis (the optimal level of subsidies 
that can be contested without jeopardizing the possibility of reaching a negotiated outcome) and 
k,t x  is a vector of explanatory variables that characterize the challenger and the defendant 
andβthe vector of their respective coefficients,  , kt ε  is a stochastic error component with an 
autoregressive of order one structure.  From the above relationship, we can derive 
() , Pr 1| kt dF ′  ==  k,t k,t xx β  where () F ′k,t x β  is the cumulative distribution function.  The 
cumulative distribution function is based on the probability density function of a trade dispute 
breaking out conditional on the specific characteristics of the countries involved, whether as 
challengers or defendants, in a monadic sense and how they relate to each other within a dyad.  
The estimation is conducted by maximum likelihood with the partial likelihood function defined 
as follows 
() ( ) ,,
1
( ) { log 1 log 1 }
T
kk t k t
t
Ld F d F
=
  ′′  =+ − −    ∑ k,t k,t β x β x β .   (5) 
Because the maximum likelihood is conditional on the nature of the explanatory variables used, 
its validity depends on whether the vector  k,t x  contains exogenous variables, lagged of  11
exogenous and endogenous variables.  The maximum likelihood estimator is found by summing 
up the  () k L β across all k .  This yields consistent parameter estimates, including under instances 
of serially correlated errors (Wooldridge, 2001).  Moreover, the efficiency of the parameter 
estimates is enhanced by using the Huber (1967) ￿sandwich￿ variance-covariance estimator to 
yield robust standard errors for the parameter estimates.  The marginal effects of challengers and 
defendants￿ characteristics on the probability of trade disputes are derived as 
() ()() / , ,  and  ii Fx f k i j i j β ′′ ∂∂ = = ≠ k,t k,t x β x β .   (6) 
  The data used in this study included trade disputes between 1995 and 2005 compiled by 
the WTO and available on its website.  In the original dataset, countries involved in trade 
disputes were classified as challengers or defendants.  The retrieved information was used to 
build 1571 dyad-years comprised of 145 dyads observed between 1995 and 2005.  While the 
time span was shorter for countries that joined the WTO after 1995, there were no gaps in the 
years.  The data also include additional information pertaining to political and economic factors 
collected from various sources and used as control variables.  The variables are described as 
follows: 
System of Government.  This variable comprises four categories, a Presidential System in which 
the executive branch of government is headed by a president who exercises greater power in the 
political system; a Semi-Presidential system in which both the president and the prime minister, 
which may or may not be from the same political party, play key roles in running the 
government; a Parliamentary System in which the legislative branch is the main branch of 
government and nominates the prime minister who runs the government; a Communist System in 
which a single party has control over the state such as China. In this study, communism is 
analyzed as a system of government rather than an economic system.  Based on the literature, it  12
is expected that states with presidential systems will be more inclined to free trade and are 
expected to be more likely to initiate disputes as well as more likely to be targeted for disputes 
(Milner 1988; Lohmann and O￿Halloran 1994; Huth and Allee 2002; McGillivray 2004). 
Stage of Democratization.  This variable is often referred to as regime type in the literature and it 
is constructed using the Polity IV data through 2004 (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr).  The polity 
score measures the level of democracy in each country with a higher score indicating a higher 
level of democratization.  We used the polity score to construct three stages of democratization 
for each challenger and defendant.  The stages of democratization in this study are: Mature 
Democracies, Emerging Democracies, and Non-Democracies.  The first category comprises 
countries which have a Polity score higher than 8 with 10 being the highest; the second category 
comprises countries which have a Polity score ranging from 6 and 8 (included); and the last 
category includes countries with a Polity score below 6 (included).     
Income Strata.  This variable illustrates the classification of various challengers and defendants 
based on their per capita gross domestic products.  The categories are: Middle and Low Income 
countries, which include among others large trading countries such as China and India, High 
Income Non-OECD, which include small countries such as Singapore, and High Income OECD 
such as the United States.  We refer to the first category as middle income from this point 
forward.   
Election Cycle.  This variable indicates whether an election was held during the year a trade 
dispute was initiated.  The election variable is used to test the effect of elections on trade 
disputes.  It is expected that elections will have a positive impact on the probability to initiate 
trade disputes.   13
Gross Domestic Product.  This is a logarithm of the real gross domestic product (GDP) variable, 
which was retrieved from the Center of International Comparison at the University of 
Pennsylvania (2007).  The gross domestic product variable is expected to have a positive impact 
on the likelihood of a country to initiate a trade dispute. 
Trade.  This is an index that measures the ratio of total imports and exports as a percentage of 
GDP.  It is an indicator of the degree of openness of an economy and is expected to have a 
negative and significant impact on trade disputes.  The data for this economic variable were also 
retrieved from Penn World Table website Center of International Comparison at the University 
of Pennsylvania (2007).  For the European Union, the index is calculated as the weighted 
average of the trade index of all member countries.   
The described variables are used to construct homogeneous and heterogeneous dyads 
using various combinations of political and economic strata of challengers and defendants used 
as explanatory variables dummy variables.  A dummy variable Europe was also introduced for 
the defendant to control for the fact that member countries generally file complaint through the 
organization but may be targeted individually by other countries.    
 
Descriptive Results 
  A preliminary analysis of the data in Table 1 indicates there were 260 disputes out of 
1,571 dyad-years, which corresponds to 16.55% of the total sample.  With respect to the 
distribution of various countries￿ characteristics within the overall sample, the results show a 
slight difference in terms of the relative proportion of the different political systems based on 
whether the countries are challengers or defendants.  As Table 1 indicates, 53.79% of the 
challengers versus 47.74% of the defendants had a presidential system of government, 43.09%  14
versus 44.18% a parliamentary system, and 2.80% versus 7.77% a semi-presidential system.  A 
further decomposition of the distribution of countries￿ system of government in relation to their 
involvement in trade disputes whether as challengers or defendants showed a significant 
deviation between presidential system (2.70%) versus parliamentary system (-2.93%).  Thus, 
countries with presidential system were more likely to be involved in trade disputes as 
challengers than countries with parliamentary system.  
  Table 1 indicates 65.63% of all challengers in the sample were mature democracies 
versus 60.15% of all defendants.  Meanwhile, 29.34% of all challengers were emerging 
democracies versus 32.02% of all defendants and 5.03% of all challengers versus 7.83% of all 
defendants were non-democracies.  Looking at countries￿ income strata, the preliminary analysis 
of the data in Table 1 indicates that 51.37% of all challengers in the overall sample were middle 
income countries versus 59.90% of all defendants.  Further, 47.93% of all challengers were high 
income OECD countries versus 40.10% of all defendants. 
Table 2 shows that the distribution of involvement in trade disputes as challengers or as 
defendants varies according to the level of democratization.  Mature democracies were 2.31% 
more likely to be challengers than defendants.  On average, over 70% of disputes occurred 
between mature democracies.  In contrast, 25% of disputes were among emerging democracies; 
however, these countries were more likely to be defendants.  Less than 5% of disputes were 
among non-democracies and they were equally likely to be defendants or challengers.  Thus, 
mature democracies were more likely to be involved in trade disputes as challengers while the 
emerging democracies were more likely to be involved as defendants. 
  The distribution of dispute involvement across income strata (Table 2) shows that middle 
income countries were more likely to be involved in trade disputes as defendants while high  15
income OECD countries were more likely to be involved as challengers.  The high income non-
OECD countries were involved in trade disputes solely as challengers.  There were significant 
differences in countries￿ involvement in trade disputes as challengers or defendants based on 
their per capita income.  This was indicated by the positive gap (4.84%) for high income 
countries and the negative gap (-4.85%) for the middle and low income countries.  As for the 
electoral cycle, countries were more likely to be involved in trade disputes as challengers when 
there was no election and as defendants during election years.  However, these differences were 
relatively minimal. 
Estimation Results 
The results are based on an estimated dyadic panel probit model with serially correlated errors 
that follow an autoregressive process of order one.  The marginal effects are derived at the means 
and the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of errors at the dyad 
level.  All the variables specified in the panel probit model and the estimation results are 
presented in Table 3.   
  There was a significant difference between dyads with homogeneous versus 
heterogeneous systems of government and their effect on trade disputes.  Homogeneous dyads 
exist when both the challenger and defendant have a parliamentary or a semi-presidential system 
of government while heterogeneity refers to the situation where the challenger￿s system of 
government is a presidential system and the defendant is a semi-presidential system.  The results 
show the likelihood of trade disputes to occur is reduced by 6.8% for homogeneous 
parliamentary dyads and by 5.6% for homogeneous semi-presidential dyads.  In contrast, the 
likelihood of a trade dispute is reduced by only 1% and is not significant when both the 
challenger and the defendant have a presidential system of government.  For dyads with  16
heterogeneous systems of government, we found significant effects on the probability of trade 
disputes in instances when the challenger followed a presidential system of government and the 
defendant a semi-presidential system of government.  Compared to the situation of reference 
(i.e., homogenous presidential dyads), the likelihood of trade disputes was 6.5% lower.  Thus, 
while the system of government did affect the probability of trade disputes, there was no 
evidence of a difference in the probability of trade disputes based on a similarity or lack thereof 
in the system of government of the parties involved.  This is evidenced by the magnitudes of the 
marginal impacts under homogeneous and heterogeneous systems of government.   
  We expected some degree of heterogeneity with respect to the challengers and 
defendants￿ income strata and its impact on trade disputes.  Such expectations were initially 
formulated in the conceptual analysis and were substantiated by the descriptive analysis, which 
provided some leads as to whether dyads with heterogeneous or homogenous income strata 
affect the likelihood of trade disputes differently.  Using homogenous high income dyads as a 
reference, the results indicate that the probability of trade disputes is significantly lower for 
homogenous middle income dyads (-8.9%).  Moreover, while there was no significant difference 
between heterogeneous dyads with middle income challengers and high income defendants 
compared to those which were homogeneous high income dyads, a significant difference was 
noted for heterogeneous dyads with middle income challengers (-9.2%).  The results show the 
likelihood of trade disputes is consistently lower for dyads with middle income challengers.  It 
also transpires from these results that a high risk of trade disputes is consistently associated with 
high income challengers.  
  We explored the extent to which the stage of democratization affects the likelihood of 
trade disputes.  Using mature democratic dyads (i.e., both the challengers and defendants were  17
mature democracies) as a reference, emerging democratic dyads are 8.9% less likely to be 
involved in trade disputes.  However, there was no significant difference between mature 
democratic dyads and non-democratic dyads.  With respect to heterogeneous stage of 
democratization, lower probabilities of trade disputes were associated with emerging democratic 
challengers and non-democratic defendants (-12.1%), mature democratic defendants with non-
democratic defendants (-7.4%), and mature democratic challengers with emerging democratic 
defendants (-5.5%).  
  The results show the stage of democratization of challenging countries has no impact on 
trade disputes.  The results show there is a significant difference between non-democracies and 
mature democracies as far as being targeted for trade disputes.  In fact, the probability of trade 
disputes increases by 8% if the targeted country (i.e., defendant) is a mature democracy.  There is 
also a significant difference across political dyads.  Trade disputes are 10.6% less likely to break 
out when the defendants and the challengers are of different political strata (i.e., mature 
democracies vs. emerging democracies).  These findings are consistent with the assertion that the 
differences between stages of democratization play a critical role in the escalation of a trade 
conflict and determine which states are more likely to appeal a WTO Panel ruling, concede, 
offer, or accept a mutually agreed solution.  While there is no consensus on the relationship 
between stage of democratization and trade disputes, our finding on this issue is broadly 
consistent with Zeng (2002, 2004) argument that the degree to which two states are 
complementary or competitive rivals is the most important factor in trade disputes because 
mature democracies tend to be competing rivals on trade issues.  
  For the country￿s degree of openness, the results show that higher trade dependency is 
associated with a lower propensity to initiate or to be a target of disputes.  This is the case for  18
countries for which total trade (import and export combined) is a significant proportion of their 
GDP.  Economic size is also a significant variable and enhances the likelihood of trade disputes 
so that the higher the real GDP, the more likely a country would initiate disputes.  There is no 
evidence that a higher GDP renders countries more vulnerable to become a target of a trade 
dispute.  
  How political and economic strata may help predict the probability of disputes was 
analyzed using the average predicted probability of disputes across these strata (Table 4).  For 
this purpose, we presented average predicted probabilities derived from samples of at least 100, 
which we compared to the overall average predicted probability of trade disputes evaluated at 
15.2%.  The average predicted probability of trade disputes was higher for homogeneous high 
income dyads, reaching 26.9% with a maximum 46.9% and a minimum of 15.4% (all of which 
were greater than the overall average probability).  The predicted probability of trade disputes 
was slightly lower for heterogeneous parliamentary/presidential dyads (20.7%), homogeneous 
mature democracies dyads (19.7%), and heterogeneous emerging/mature democracies (18.3%).  
Thus, while these results made the case that trade disputes were higher for homogeneous mature 
democracies compared to the rest, they do not provide any clear evidence whether the probability 
of trade disputes is higher under heterogeneous or homogeneous stage of democratization.  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
This study analyzed conceptually and empirically the political and economic determinants of 
trade disputes under the WTO and attempted to shed some light into the role of underlying 
differences stemming from various stages of democratization, system of government, wealth, 
economic strength, and trade dependency of the parties involved on the probability of trade  19
disputes.  The study yielded mixed results with respect to the nature of the political and 
economic system.  In cases such as high income strata and mature democracies, homogeneity of 
the dyad seems to play a greater role at determining trade disputes.  For the system of 
government, the heterogeneity of the parties involved was more likely to increase the probability 
of trade disputes.   
One possible explanation pertains to the dynamic nature of the dispute settlement 
process, which, from the initiation to the outcome, involves the interaction between two (or 
more) states.  In our study, we did not address third parties￿ roles in escalating trade conflicts or 
helping to enhance mutually agreed solutions.  Another explanation may be linked to the rise of 
new economic powers such as China, India, and Brazil that renders moot the old paradigm of 
trade disputes, which tended to oppose rich, powerful, and democratic states.  These countries 
have become major players in world commerce; however they are different in their systems of 
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Table 1.  Description of the Variables Used in the Analysis (Challenger vs. Defendant) 
1995-2005 
 
   Frequency  Percentage 
Variable  Category  Challenger Defendant Challenger Defendant 
Presidential 845  750 53.79  47.74 
Parliamentary 677  694  43.09  44.18 
Semi-
Presidential  44 122  2.80  7.77 
System of 
Government 
Communist 5  5  0.32  0.32 
Mature 
Democracies 1031  945  65.63  60.15 
Emerging 




Democracies  79 123  5.03  7.83 
Middle and 
Low Income  807 941  51.37  59.90 
High Income 
Non-OECD  11 0  0.70  0.00 
Income Strata 
High Income  753  630  47.93  40.10 
Election 474  467  30.17  29.73  Election Cycle 
No Election  1097  1104  69.83  70.27 







Table 2.  Distribution of Dispute Involvement as Challenger or Defendant across 
Countries￿ Political and Economic Strata (in percent) 
 
Variable Category  Challenger  Defendant  Difference 
Presidential 54.62  51.92  2.70 
Parliamentary 41.15  43.08  -2.93 
Semi-Presidential 3.85  4.62  -0.77 
System of 
Government 
Communist 0.38  0.38  0.00 
Mature Democracies  71.54  69.23  2.31 
Emerging Democracies  24.23  26.15  -1.92 
Stage of 
Democratization 
Non-Democracies 4.23  4.62  -0.39 
Middle and Low Income  41.15  45.00  -4.85 
High Income Non-OECD  0.38  0.00  0.38 
Income Strata 
High Income  58.46  55.00  3.46 
Election 32.69  34.23  -1.54  Election Cycle 
No Election  67.31  65.77  1.54 
  25
 Table 3: Marginal Estimates of Dyadic Panel Probit Estimation 
 
Notes: The parameters presented are marginal coefficients of the dyadic panel probit calculated 
at the means.  Each dyad is comprised of a challenger and defendant that may have similar of 
different political system, belong to the same or different income strata, or are at similar or 




Coefficients Std  Error  Means 
Parliamentary Parliamentary  -0.068**  0.029  0.227 
Semi-Presidential Semi-Presidential  -0.056*  0.032  0.007 
Presidential Parliamentary  -0.010  0.027  0.215 
Parliamentary Presidential  -0.011  0.033  0.161 
Presidential Semi-Presidential  -0.065**  0.029  0.028 
Semi-Presidential Presidential  -0.003  0.049  0.021 
Middle Income  Middle Income  -0.089***  0.025  0.269 
High Income  Middle Income  -0.048  0.033  0.191 
Middle Income  High Income  -0.092***  0.023  0.323 
Mature Democracies  Non Democracies  -0.057  0.040  0.041 
Non Democracies  Mature Democracies  -0.074***  0.026  0.024 
Mature Democracies  Emerging Democracies  -0.055**  0.028  0.197 
Emerging Democracies  Mature Democracies  -0.042  0.030  0.160 
Non Democracies  Emerging Democracies  -0.020  0.070  0.013 
Emerging Democracies  Non Democracies  -0.121***  0.024  0.024 
Non Democracies  Non Democracies  -0.021  0.040  0.013 
Emerging Democracies  Emerging Democracies  -0.089***  0.024  0.109 
Election   Election  0.025  0.033  0.096 
-- Europe  -0.075**  0.033  0.083 
Openness --  -0.038**  0.015  3.880 
-- Openness  -0.030**  0.015  3.865 
Real GDP  --  0.012**  0.005  20.587 
-- Real  GDP  -0.004  0.005  20.634 
Correlation   0.025     
Number of Observations    1571     
Number of Groups    145     
Wald Chi2    209.42     
P-value   0.000     T
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